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Abstract
Brazil’s education system is seen as having 
undergone substantial reform since 1995, ten 
years after the country returned to democracy. 
What were the reasons for the delay in reform 
during this ‘lost decade’ in education between 
1985 and 1994?  The paper identifies the reasons, 
including the educational legacy left by the 
outgoing military regime (including commitments 
it was unable to achieve, distortions in its spending 
allocation and the relative absence of control over 
the private sector); the political instability of the 
new republic’s first governments and increasing 
decentralisation of its political institutions; and 
the development of the education sector as an 
increasingly politicised arena of contestation 
between left and right, which would persist 
into the reform period after 1995.  The paper 
concludes by questioning whether this cycle of 
political instability and contestation in education 
has reached an end with the entry of the PT into 
government in 2003.
Keywords: Military period (1964-85), New 
Republic (1985-94), education and politics.
Resumo
o sistema educacional brasileiro é visto como 
tendo sofrido uma reforma substancial desde 
1995, dez anos depois de o país ter retornado à 
democracia. Quais foram as razões para o atraso 
na reforma durante esta “década perdida” em 
matéria de educação entre 1985 e 1994? Este 
artigo identifica as razões, incluindo o legado 
educacional deixado pelo regime militar (incluindo 
os compromissos que não foram alcançados, as 
distorções na alocação das despesas e da relativa 
ausência de controle sobre o setor privado); a 
instabilidade política do primeiro governo da 
nova república e a crescente descentralização 
de suas instituições políticas; e o desenvolvimento 
do setor da educação como um espaço cada vez 
mais politizado de contestação entre Esquerda e 
direita, que persistem até o período da reforma 
pós-1995. o artigo conclui questionando se este 
ciclo de instabilidade política e contestação na 
educação teria chegado a um fim com a entrada 
do PT no governo em 2003.
Palavras-chave: Período militar (1964-85); 
Nova República (1985-94); Educação; 
Políticas Educacionais.
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5The decade after 1982 is usually characterized 
as Brazil’s ‘lost decade’ in economic terms. 
Compared to the high levels of economic growth 
during the early 1970s, the military regime’s 
state-led model of development began to flag 
in the latter part of the decade before becoming 
unstuck in the wake of the debt crisis.  The 
economic slowdown coupled with rising political 
dissatisfaction of the regime contributed to a 
pacted democratic transition in 1985 in which the 
military removed themselves from power in favour 
of their political allies on the right, known as the 
new republic.
Even if the new democracy did not promise 
an immediate break with the economic direction 
of the past, it did appear to augur new political 
and social rights through the 1988 constitution. 
rights that had been previously granted on the 
basis of employment in the formal sector became 
universal, including in social security, education 
and health.  Yet the achievement of these rights 
did not lead to immediate benefits across 
Brazilian society.  While they existed on paper, 
the governing elite failed to effect the changes 
necessary to make good the promises laid out. 
The result was arguably a ‘lost decade’ for social 
policy in Brazil; and nowhere was this starker than 
in education, where substantial reforms did not 
begin until the mid-1990s under the government 
of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. These include key 
changes in the curricular guidelines, constitutional 
responsibilities for education, improved pay and 
working conditions for teachers and national 
forms of evaluation and performance.
if these changes only occurred after 1995, 
what could account for the relative lack of reform 
during the new republic’s first decade? Why did 
Brazil’s newly democratic and legitimate elite 
fail to introduce the kinds of policies that would 
make the commitments laid out in the 1988 
constitution effective? Using the case study of 
education, this paper examines the constraints 
that the country’s governments faced in delivering 
reform. in particular it highlights the key obstacles 
presented by during the first ten years of the new 
republic in the educational sector. These include 
the educational legacy left by the outgoing 
military regime (including commitments it was 
unable to achieve, distortions in its spending 
allocation and the relative absence of control over 
the private sector); the political instability of the 
new republic’s first governments and increasing 
decentralization of its political institutions; and 
the development of the education sector as an 
increasingly politicized arena of contestation, 
which would persist into the reform period after 
1995.  arguably this last point is the main legacy of 
Brazil’s ‘lost decade’ in education, by lasting into 
the reform period during the Cardoso government. 
The paper then concludes by questioning whether 
the entry of the PT into government has begun to 
weaken politicization in the educational sphere 
(as well as others) and arguably contributing 
towards a ‘normalization’ of public policy debate 
in Brazil.
The military’s educational legacy
The military’s educational legacy to Brazil in 
1985 was contradictory: while it had overseen a 
substantial increase in coverage at all levels of 
education – primary, secondary and tertiary – it 
was a system that was in both financial crisis and 
without clear means of control.  This legacy owed 
much to three main factors: one, the continuing 
political link between the military regime and 
its democratic successor; two, the regime’s 
distorted financial priorities in education; three, 
the relative failure of new financial mechanisms to 
assist the regime’s educational goals; and four, a 
relative absence of control over the private sector 
expansion of educational provision.
First, the departure of the military regime in 
Brazil did not represent an abrupt change from 
either its successors in the new republic.  The 
military regime had its origins in a coalition 
between the armed forces and prominent sections 
among the economic, political and social elites 
(GrEEn 2003; aliMonda 1984; lEvinE 1979). 
viewing leftist threats from all parts, the regime 
began to reverse the relatively decentralized 
political system then in operation, by centralizing 
control and reducing the power of other political 
actors; Congress was initially closed, elected 
state governors replaced by appointed ones 
and all political party activity banned.  This 
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6approach was subsequently loosened to allow 
limited participation, although only through the 
two officially sanctioned parties allowed: the 
government arEna party and the opposition 
MdB (sKidMorE, 1988).  However, the regime 
went through periods of repression and relative 
tolerance throughout its 21 years.  This indicated 
a regime that oscillated between moderate and 
hard-line tendencies (CaMMaCK, 1991).  But the 
tension between moderates and hardliners was 
always more stylistic than substantial, since the 
underlying theme under each remained the same: 
the regime would brook only limited dissent.
The regime was a largely conservative 
coalition in its economic and social policies.  it 
identified with the political right, justifying its 
actions in 1964 on the grounds of communist 
subversion.  its defense of conservative interests 
was apparent in the moral tone it sought to 
impose on Brazilian society (and in the nature 
of the moral and civic education requirement 
that it introduced in schools and universities) 
and the pursuance of the prevailing state-led 
model of capitalist development.  alongside its 
support of the private sector (including state 
support), it also maintained the previous regime’s 
entitlement model, which ensured rights such as 
social security and pensions to those who were 
employed within the formal sector.  during the first 
part of the regime this approach appeared to yield 
substantial dividends in the form of an ‘economic 
miracle’ by the early 1970s.  Furthermore, with 
the assumption of increasingly moderate leaders 
from the mid-1970s on, including a process of 
liberalization or ‘abertura’ under the Geisel (1975-
79) and Figueiredo (1979-85) governments, the 
Brazilian regime was relatively benign when 
compared to that of other military governments in 
the region.
The armed forces-elite relationship which 
underpinned the regime began to ebb towards 
the latter during this more moderate phase from 
the late 1970s on. The ‘abertura’ coincided with 
rising political dissatisfaction, both within the 
elite and wider society about the limited degree 
of participation viable under the system. The 
situation was exacerbated in 1982 by the debt 
crisis, which directly challenged the generals’ 
claims to competent government. during the first 
part of the 1980s Brazil was subject to widespread 
protests and challenges against the regime from 
all quarters. The armed forces’ position was 
undermined; by 1985 they were ready to leave the 
stage.  in their place the new democracy that had 
emerged remained in the control of the coalitions’ 
other main partners: the military’s political allies. 
such circumstances made some degree of policy 
continuation more likely. This was especially 
so in the commitment to the military regime’s 
development model, which remained largely 
state-led until the end of the 1980s.
second, the military regime’s development 
model was largely distorted in its outcomes. This 
was especially apparent in the particularistic way 
that it dispensed social benefits, including in 
education.  Between 1964 and 1985 the number 
of primary school students had more than doubled 
to 24.77m and those in secondary education had 
grown six-fold to 3.02m in the 21 years of the 
dictatorship, compared to the 1.37m students in 
higher education in 1985 (iBGE, various issues). 
The regime stated that it aimed to increase the 
amount of skilled labour, which would require 
improvements in primary education and an equal 
distribution of funds across primary, secondary 
and tertiary modalities (MaCnEill, 1970). at first 
glance this seemed viable: the 1982 debt crisis did 
not appear to have unduly affected the resources 
available for public spending education. While the 
proportion allocated by the regime on education 
by the federal government had declined from 
11.1% in 1965 to 5.3% in 1975, during the late-
1970s and 1980s it had risen, to 7.2% in 1980 and 
9.3% in 1985 (iBGE, various issues).
However, underneath these overarching 
figures, the military’s educational priorities were 
skewed. The division of educational responsibility 
in Brazil’s political system meant that the bulk of 
federal government spending was concentrated 
in higher education rather than in primary and 
secondary education, which were responsible for 
primary and secondary education. The fact that 
the regime had introduced greater centralization 
of control had an untoward effect on education: 
while primary and secondary education suffered, 
the main beneficiary of government spending 
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7became higher education. Furthermore, the 
allocation of central government spending meant 
that it was students from the wealthier sections of 
society, who dominated higher education. indeed, 
spending on primary and secondary education 
declined throughout the military period (Graph 
1), despite the fact that by 1985 90% of students 
were in primary education compared to just 1% in 
higher education (iadB, 1993). indeed, concern 
with primary education – insofar as it may be 
measured by spending priorities – only became 
pressing towards the end of the regime, in the late 
1970s. indeed, additional data suggests that by 
1985 the amount spent by the central government 
on primary education had risen to a similar 
amount to that in higher education (BroWn, 
2002). Meanwhile the big loser, in terms of federal/
central funds, was secondary education; its share 
of resources fell throughout the regime. This was 
especially problematic, since a 1971 educational 
law made vocational education obligatory in 
all secondary schools; yet there was no way of 
ensuring that this could be implemented. The 
result was its repeal in 1982 (nisKiEr, 2007).
Graph 1: Federal Government 
Allocation of Education Spending, 
1963-1983
introduced during the regime’s fi rst year in 1964 
(MEC/inEP, 1965; nEvEs, 1992). However, it was 
incapable of providing a complete solution to 
funding, not least because of the lack of municipal 
involvement in educational fi nance and the failure 
to redirect funds away from richer states (nEvEs, 
1992). Furthermore, the salário-educação’s worth 
was questionable, owing to its fl uctuating and 
inconsistent value (Graph 2). despite an increase 
in value of 29.5% between 1974 and 1977, by 
1980 it was worth 86.5% of its 1974 value and 
64.9% in 1984 (iPEa, 1987).
Graph 2: Value of Salário-Educação, 
1974-1985
 
Sources: IBGE, 1960-85
Third, in response to the structure of 
educational responsibility between the federal, 
state and municipal levels, the regime sought 
to resolve the fi nancial crisis in primary and 
secondary education through the introduction of 
a new funding mechanism to support increased 
investment in primary education. This became 
known as the salário-educação and was 
Note: 1974=100
Source: IPEA 1987
Fourth, alongside the salário-educação, the 
regime also made use of the private sector to 
assist with their education plans. increasing the 
number of primary and secondary (as well as 
higher) education institutions might be achieved 
by encouraging greater involvement by the 
private sector. The military-introduced 1967 
constitution maintained an obligation on forms to 
provide primary education while the private sector 
contributed to a rising proportion of schools in the 
secondary and higher education sectors (BraZil, 
1967; BroWn, 2002; iBGE, various issues). 
However, much of this growth was achieved at 
the expense of adequate regulation, evaluation 
and supervision; the result was an increasing 
section of the Brazilian education system which 
incorporated a growing number of students at all 
levels that was of poor quality and performance 
(sCHWarTZMann, interview, 2007; soUZa, 
2005; Banas, 1974).
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education funding in the fi rst decade 
of the new republic (1985-94)
The educational legacy left by the departing 
military regime in 1985 presented a challenge to 
the fi rst governments of the new republic. on the 
one hand the military had overseen an increase 
in the size of the educational system at all levels: 
there were 1.36m teachers at all levels and 31.65m 
students from pre-school to higher education 
level, the vast bulk of which (78%) were in primary 
school and 4% in higher education (iBGE, 1987/88; 
2003). in the fi rst ten years of the new republic the 
number of primary school students rose to 32.7m 
while those in secondary education increased from 
3.02m to 5.37m students and teachers at all levels 
in 1998 stood at 1.98m (iBGE, 1999; 2003). on the 
other, the distortions in educational funding meant 
that the bulk of federal government spending went 
to the smaller higher educational section, which 
was also complemented by considerable – and 
relatively uncontrolled – private sector institutions.
notwithstanding the situation, the fi rst new 
republic governments were unable to address 
these issues. This was due mainly to the instability 
regarding these governments generally during the 
fi rst decade of democracy and the persistence of 
distortions within education spending coupled with 
decentralization of Brazil’s political institutions after 
1985. Before taking offi ce, the president-elect, 
Tancredo neves, died; he was succeeded by his 
vice-president, José sarney, who was a political 
supporter of the old regime. sarney sought to 
kick-start the state-led development approach, 
including the use of protectionist and central 
planning measures (FonT, 2004; sPanaKos, 
2004; MoUra, 1993), while his successor, 
Fernando Collor de Mello, opted for a more free-
market, neo-liberal model to revive the Brazilian 
economy, including the use of privatizations of 
state assets, deregulation and the reduction in the 
size of the state generally (CoEs, 1995; lonGon, 
1993). The process looked to have reached a 
premature end with his resignation on corruption 
charges, although the course was maintained 
under his vice-president, itamar Franco, who saw 
out the remainder of his term. The end of the fi rst 
decade was notable for the introduction of the real 
Plan, which not only brought an end to infl ation and 
contributed to economic stabilization in Brazil; it 
also delivered the 1994 presidential election to his 
fi nance minister, Cardoso.
Brazil’s economic and fi nancial situation after 
1985 was refl ected in the government’s funds for 
education. as it had been under the military regime, 
the model remained skewed in several ways. First, 
the amount allocated by the federal government to 
education generally suffered a decline, falling from 
13.3% to 2.9% between 1989 and 1990 (Graph 3). 
This was arguably – and paradoxically – due to the 
neo-liberal direction of the governments after 1989, 
which cut the amount allocated to social services 
while increasing the proportion spent on reforming 
the state (administration and planning).
Graph 3: Federal Government Spending 
in Percentage Terms, 1985-1994
Source: IBGE, various years
second, within education spending government 
allocations continued to prioritize those in higher 
income groups, mainly through the greater amount 
allocated to higher education over that of other 
educational modalities. By 1990 the wealthiest 
sectors of society, which accounted for 50% of 
university students, reaped the main benefi t of 
federal government expenditure (FiEsP, 1990). 
This was more evident generally across spending 
in education at all (federal, state and municipal) 
levels, with those in higher income groups receiving 
proportionally more public funding; while 27% of 
the population who came from households earning 
more than two minimum salaries received 34% of 
education spending, this compared favorably to 
the 44% spent on the half of the population (51%) of 
bURTON | bRAzIL’S ‘LOST DECADE’ IN EDUCATION, 1985-1994: hOw TO ACCOUNT fOR ThE LACk Of REfORm IN ThE NEw REPUbLIC?
9households earning under a minimum salary (iPEa, 
1996). such retrogressive public spending made 
sense in the context of these fi rst new republic 
governments’ bases: despite the democratic 
transition in 1985, their support constituted those 
same sectors of society that had formed part of the 
coalition under the military, including the political 
and economic elites.
Third, alongside the neo-liberal shift and the 
legacy of greater higher education spending, 
the fi rst new republic governments’ educational 
spending was challenged by a combination of a 
new political reality coupled with the persistence 
of discretionary funds for other, non-higher 
education modalities. While the military regime had 
been relatively insulated from social and political 
demands, this did not extend to its successors. 
it had operated a controlled form of electoral 
representation, though it was invariably subject to 
manipulation of the electoral rules. By contrast the 
new democracy after 1985 had no such means 
of control; politicians were once again in charge 
and subject to competing demands from their 
constituents. The result was an increase in the level 
of ‘pork-barrel’ politics, with politicians seeking to 
enhance their ability to access state funds for their 
constituencies. This was most evident in the nature 
of educational policy under Collor. notwithstanding 
the government’s neo-liberal image, Collor’s 
priority was in the construction of new schools and 
infrastructure in the urban periphery through the 
construction of integrated school and community 
centers, or CiaCs (GoldEMBErG, 1993; 
interview, 2008; HEnriQUE, 1993). But given the 
discretionary nature of the programme, its funding 
was subject to competing political demands; 
the result was an uncertain and insecure budget 
(GoldEMBErG, interview, 2008).
in addition to growing politicization in Congress, 
the new republic governments were faced with 
a similar process occurring at the sub-national 
level as well. Whereas the military had centralized 
power across all policy areas, governments 
after 1985 were relatively powerless to maintain 
this model, with increasing decentralization and 
demands among the features of the Brazilian 
political system in this period (MEdiCi & MaCiEl, 
1996; nEUBaUEr da silva & CrUZ, 1996; nEPP, 
1988; aBraHÃo dE CasTro, 1996). Coupled 
with competing political demands at the local level, 
spending on those modalities for which states and 
municipalities had responsibility – the primary and 
secondary levels – were uncontrolled, resulting in 
a general decline for spending for these forms at 
all levels; between 1986 and 1991 state spending 
on primary education fell by a third while that by 
municipalities dropped by 40% (Graph 4).
Graph 4: Primary Education Spending 
Indicies by Education Level, 1986-1991
Note: 1986=100
Source: Sobrinho, 1994.
The effect of the relatively weak and fi nancially 
insecure nature of Brazilian education generally 
meant limited funds available to develop and 
improve the system. alongside the uncertainty 
of suffi cient funds to build new infrastructure, 
this was also apparent in the limited assistance 
towards teachers’ working and pay conditions 
as well. indeed, this would be one of the main 
priorities of the incoming Cardoso government 
in 1995, the result of which was the creation of 
a constitution amendment that created a new 
fund, FUndEF, that guaranteed resources to 
assist primary education: 18% of federal and 
25% of state and municipal tax revenue would 
be allocated to education, with 60% of those 
revenues being directed to teachers’ salaries 
(lEvaCiC & doWnEs, 2004).
in addition to limited public funds for education, 
the new republic governments continued to 
support the private sector in educational provision. 
But whereas private provision had been substantial 
during the military period, it did not yield any notable 
changes during the new republic’s fi rst decade. 
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This was no doubt due in part to the economic 
difficulties faced by the sector in the period. Between 
1985 and 1994 there were slight reductions in the 
number of private secondary and higher education 
institutions with only a small increase in the number 
of private primary schools (iBGE, various issues). 
indeed, notwithstanding the neo-liberal direction of 
the Collor presidency, Goldemberg observed that 
there was no overt effort to encourage the private 
sector at the higher education level, mainly because 
the bulk of students were already catered within that 
sector (interview, 2008).
Opposition from education actors: 
political and corporatist demands
Beyond the political instability of the new 
republic’s first three governments, the growing 
decentralized power of Brazil’s sub-national political 
institutions and the related impact that these factors 
had on the financial condition of the educational 
system, the first decade of democracy saw the 
new republic challenged by rising dissatisfaction 
among the wider educational community, such 
as social movements associated with teachers 
and students.  although this did not sufficiently 
undermine the political system, it did in one 
instance contribute to the resignation of Collor from 
the presidency. While they individually remained 
relatively limited in their capacity to influence 
educational policy, where they did present a 
challenge was in their association and identification 
with a prominent political opposition movement on 
the left. The result was to make education an area 
of political contestation that would persist into the 
reform period under Cardoso.
Generally, the demands of teachers and 
(mainly university) students were concerned with 
improving the financial situation in education. 
For students this meant greater access to more 
grants and assistance; to teachers this meant 
improvements in their pay and working conditions. 
although the teachers’ union (CPB, subsequently 
CnTE) leadership was dealt with the framing of 
educational rights and responsibilities within the 
1988 constitution, including the form of participation 
to be used to represent social movement demands 
in the constituent assembly and greater central 
funds for education, they were also concerned with 
improvements to their working conditions, salaries 
and pension rights (Brasil, 1988; nEUBaUEr da 
silva & CrUZ, 1996; CPB, 1987b). These latter 
points became the main point of government-union 
relations over the course of the decade, prompted 
by a decline in teachers’ salaries comparable to 
other public sector workers and contributing to 
national protests and strikes in favour of a national 
minimum salary (CPB, 1986; CPB, 1987a). 
Meanwhile, the student movement was particularly 
prominent in the moral protest against corruption 
that was generated by the scandal surrounding 
Collor in 1992 (BorEn, 2001). The first protest, 
involving 10,000 students, took place in são Paulo 
in august, following several months of media 
campaigning. The protests gained momentum, 
attracting wider support in society, although the 
students remained the most visible group within 
it. despite their influence though, the movement 
did not last beyond the president’s resignation; by 
1993 student mobilisation was once again low.
Both movements recognised their own 
limitations: the teachers’ union leadership noted a 
relative lack of regional unity, common dialogue and 
strategy among its constituent union members at 
state level (CnTE, 1990). University and secondary 
school students were similarly weakly organised; 
notwithstanding their role as an opposition force 
during the latter stages of the military regime and 
once again during the Collor scandal, in the late 
1980s and after 1992 it was less politically active 
or ideologically motivated (CosTa, 1996; MisCHE, 
1997). increasingly, the concerns of students were 
primarily work-based, owing to the economic 
difficulties faced by society in this period.
despite the relatively weak position of these 
movements, their demands (with the exception of 
the Collor protests) were largely characterised as 
‘corporatist’ by those involved in the formulation 
and development of educational policy 
(GoldEMBErG, interview, 2008; soUZa, 2005; 
soUZa, interview, 2007; sCHWarTZMann, 
interview, 2007). Corporatism is understood here 
as those demands which are particularistic rather 
than universal in nature and concerned primarily 
with the welfare and benefit of a given community, 
in this case those of teachers and students, rather 
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than the wider educational system as a whole. The 
association of these demands and ‘corporatism’ 
tends to be presented in a negative fashion and 
generally distinguishes the political position of the 
commentator from that of the actor. admittedly, 
this narrow interpretation of the motivations of 
educational social movements overlooks the 
work of other groups which sought to construct 
alternative forms of education rather than simply 
challenging government policy. This included the 
MsT and its schools during this period.
Even if a distinction is drawn between the 
types of activity undertaken by the educational 
social movements themselves, a broader 
separation lay between them and the first new 
republic governments regarding their political 
opinions and outlooks. While the first new 
republic governments were largely associated 
and identified with the political right, initially 
through social and economic conservatives under 
sarney and subsequently social conservatives 
and economic liberals under Collor (and Franco 
to a lesser extent), the teacher and student 
movements, along with nGos and professionals 
in the educational field, tended to identify with 
the left generally and the main opposition 
political party, the PT, in particular (CUnHa, 
1995). indeed, despite the relative weakness 
of the movements individually, the leaderships 
of both the teacher and student movements 
were largely dominated by PT and other leftist 
activists, including the communists. When 
coupled with other left-leaning social movements, 
these educational actors played a key role in the 
development of the PT as the main political (and 
educational) alternative in challenging the nature 
of the conservative transition to democracy by the 
outgoing military regime and its political allies. 
in education this was similarly the case: by the 
end of the new republic’s first decade, whereas 
(social democratic) reformers such as Cardoso 
were associated with merely seeking to improve 
the planning and effectiveness of the education 
system, those associated with the PT were seen 
in a more radical light. in particular this would 
involve the use of education in a more political 
fashion, to construct citizenship and transform the 
nature of Brazilian society (GraCindo, 1995).
Conclusion
By 1995 the educational system in Brazil was in 
need of a long and overdue reform.  Following the 
1988 constitution steps had been taken to introduce 
new, more detailed national education guidelines. 
after several years the resulting document reflected 
the involvement of the new Brazilian democracy: 
it contained 298 articles and 1263 amendments 
(raMal, 1997). The various proposals never 
reached the voting stage in Congress: they 
were supplanted by a new, shorter and less 
detailed proposal presented by the new Cardoso 
government that took office in 1995. Cardoso had 
made education one of his key priorities during 
the 1994 presidential election and appointed his 
manifesto coordinator and close political ally, Paulo 
renato souza, to the post of education minister. 
over the following four years key reforms would 
be enacted through a constitutional amendment 
to address the financing of primary education and 
teachers and measures to introduce evaluative 
mechanisms at both school and university level 
and national curricular guidelines among others.
Why the reform period had taken so long to 
take effect owed much to the new political realities 
faced by the first governments after democracy’s 
return in 1985. They had inherited an expanded 
education system with a rising population, but 
with a financial model that no longer worked and 
an economic context which was not favorable to 
the expansion of the private sector in educational 
provision. Whereas the predecessor military regime 
had been largely able to control demands from the 
centre, the sarney, Collor and Franco governments 
were unable to follow the same approach. They 
faced new demands and challenges within the 
system, including from states, municipalities 
and social movements in the educational sector 
which had an adverse effect. Political expediency 
became the main form of action, the development 
of a sustainable and improved education system 
sacrificed to short term politically-inspired ends 
(GoldEMBErG, interview, 2008).
Yet it would be erroneous to assume that 
little was achieved educationally in Brazil during 
the first decade after 1985. during the first 
government after the generals’ departure, the new 
freedoms presented by democracy enabled social 
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and political pressure to be brought to bear on 
ending the vestiges of authoritarian rule within the 
educational system. This included the dismantling 
of the military regime’s contact points within 
universities and the elimination of the national 
Civic and Moral Commission which oversaw the 
moral and civic education courses at all education 
modalities (andE et al, 1988, vol. 2).
arguably the main legacy of Brazil’s ‘lost 
decade’ in education was the development of 
the sector into an arena of political contestation, 
thereby weakening any possibility of policy 
consensus. While the political system was more 
democratic after 1985, it arguably suffered from a 
lack of legitimacy from some quarters, most notably 
on the radical wing of the left including the PT. as 
a result, the period after the military’s departure 
was seen as a period in which democracy was 
being ‘democratized’, with the PT seen as the main 
vehicle by which the democratic transition would be 
completed. This had implications in the educational 
sphere as well, since many of the interest groups, 
such as teachers and students, identified with 
this vision. The result of this separation between 
government and wider educational community (of 
the left) would have lasting repercussions: owing 
to their strong identification with the left, they were 
bound to come into conflict with government, 
which they characterized as dominated by the 
right. This extended to the opposition sustained by 
the teachers’ union against the Collor presidency: 
although Collor was broadly neo-liberal in his 
approach, this approach was relatively absent in 
his educational policy, according to Goldemberg 
(interview, 2008).
The political bias at the root of the government-
educational community debate persisted into 
the period of education reform under Cardoso 
after 1995: despite the teachers’ union demand 
for greater educational funding by the centre, it 
remained neutral on FUndEF while the PT voiced its 
opposition towards the fund (souza 2005). similarly, 
the PT-teacher-student alliance was evident in the 
various strikes and protests carried out during the 
Cardoso presidency (PoErnEr, 2004; sTUMPF, 
interview, 2006; soUZa 2005; interview, 2007). 
From a reformist perspective this would appear 
odd: both primary education finance and teachers’ 
remuneration improved during the Cardoso years 
as did those remaining in education. Yet the political 
division between the two sides persisted until the end 
of the Cardoso presidency.  since 2003 and the entry 
of the PT into government there has been a marked 
shift in the parameters of the educational debate: no 
longer is education an arena where heated political 
opposition occurs. indeed, the PT government 
has largely maintained the model bequeathed it 
and limited itself to changes within the existing 
framework. These have included: the expansion 
of FUndEF to FUndEB, ensuring a constitutionally 
guaranteed fund that will include both pre-school 
and secondary as well as primary education; the 
introduction of Pro-Uni, a subsidy for poorer students 
in the private university system; an expansion of 
public universities; and the development of a new 
education plan, including new evaluative and 
accountability mechanisms. What has been notable 
regarding these policies is the relative absence 
of prominent opposition on the part of the wider 
educational community as occurred in the previous 
period, between 1985-94 and then under Cardoso. 
This could well suggest the achievement of political 
consensus within Brazil’s educational sphere and 
the replacement of competing political visions with 
one primarily concerned with providing technical 
solutions to educational problems.
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